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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Radicals Go to Tehran To Form New Rejectionist Front

93AE0603A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Sep p 7

[Article by Amir Tahiri]

[Text] While the PLO and Israel are continuing to proceed toward realizing the "historical achievement," a group of militant organizations have begun sending their envoys to Tehran in order to create a new rejectionist front. According to reports, 30 organizations have agreed to go in this direction. The group will of course include the Lebanese Hizballah Party. It will also include delegates from the Sudanese organization headed by Hasan al-Turabi, several branches of what is called "the Islamic Jihad," in addition to representatives from Hamas. It is not yet known whether rejectionists like the Ahmad Jibril group and Abu Nidal group will also join the movement.

A number of struggle "professionals" from various Western countries will also be present. They come under the fundamentalist group known as the "East Wimbledon." They are individuals fashioned along the lines of the star of a new English play. The star is an unemployed man, who, after having fallen on hard times for a long time because of the economic recession, hits on the idea of getting himself circumcised and joining the active fundamentalist groups in Wimbledon.

During this month we will see in Tehran a group of people who would tell us that 'Arafat is a "traitor of Islam" and that the Palestinian problem is so important and vital that it should not be left in the hands of the Palestinians, for there are people there who are more Catholic than the Pope.

We became somewhat familiar with the tone that will prevail at the demonstration in Tehran through the official media and sermons of clerics who usually reflect the government views. Many political Middle Eastern clichés are in circulation, such as treason, conspiracy, surrender, impostors, imperialist agents, backstabbing, demonic plan, and blood-shedding and so on.

Fiery and angry speeches are used in order to prevent any serious discussion of the deal, since those attending the conference did not tell the public what the pros and cons of the deal are in their view.

A method such as this will encourage the use of man's ability at criticism. This is a very serious matter for the demagogues, because once people start using their brains, then they will quickly discover the deceit of the "rejectionists" of all types.

It is not difficult to compile militant slogans, particularly for those who are not directly affected by the Palestinian tragedy. Also, it is not difficult for Tehran to sign a few documents for its political agents here and there. Also it is not difficult to plant a few bombs and fire a few Katyushas. It is also very easy to claim heroism at the expense of others, and for one to become a revolutionary struggler from a distance and let the others fall martyrs so that tears will be shed for them.

What's difficult is to produce alternative, harmonious, and cohesive policies. It is for this reason in particular that the

various "rejectionist fronts," which were established in the past five decades, have failed, bearing in mind that at a certain time Yasir 'Arafat was a member of some of them.

The question now is: Can the "Gaza and Jericho first" option be a good beginning to realize the Palestinian people's legitimate aspirations? The answer in my view is no. I am convinced after having closely followed the peace process during the past two years that the Palestinians could have obtained a better agreement. But I have no right, nor does any foreign party, to try to undermine the agreement. The final decision is up to the Palestinian people and their leadership.

If this agreement has any positive aspects, one of them is that for the first time since the mid-forties the Palestinians have taken an initiative on their own behalf. In other words, the Palestinian people have cut the umbilical cord that linked them to the so-called "Arab World," which often exploited their problems in order to serve its own interests.

Therefore, what is required from the groups meeting in Tehran is to ask themselves a simple question: How far are they prepared to go in order to blow up an agreement they consider bad?

Discussion and debate are useful and not harmful. The Palestinian parties opposing the agreement have every right to remove 'Arafat by political means and propose an alternative strategy for peace and justice.

But what is not permissible is to sow the seeds of a civil war in the name of defending the Palestinian problem. For we all have seen the grave consequences of this kind of foreign intervention in many parts of the world. The massacres being committed in Afghanistan are committed by Afghan hands. But foreign forces serving their own interest are the manipulators behind the scenes.

The emergence of Tehran as leader of a new opposition front will cause harm rather than good. Iran has absolutely no national interest in attempting to blow up an Arab-Israeli settlement. Also it is not in its interest to appear in the Arab world as a leader of an organization whose strategy is based on violence and on suspect ideologies. Iran is a major and regional power and, therefore, has to behave accordingly. It is not a desert and isolated country like Libya so that it would become a laboratory for analyzing the crazy ideas of some people.

Finally, it is said that the most serious mistake in politics is for a politician to do something that he does not need to do. This applies to Iran, since nothing is compelling it to embrace politicians like al-Turabi and Jibril and the fundamentalists of "East Wimbledon."

ALGERIA

FIS Activists Abroad; Cells Identified

94AF0053B Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
16-22 Nov 93 pp 6-7

[Article by Louaifi Bennaoum: "The FIS Overseas"]

[Text] The FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] has some 500 activists in foreign lands—many of them salaried cadres—and 1,500 to 2,000 sympathizers.

Anouar Haddam, Dihna Abderrahmane, and Ouli Abdeslam all belong to what might be called the foreign "brain trust" of the FIS.

All three are nuclear physicists. Just coincidence, or convergence of interests?

The answer lies in the motive behind the assassination of a senior officer in the ANP (People's National Army), Redouane Sari, a nuclear physicist himself and thus known to the above group.

Did Mr. Sari rebuff Haddam and his associates when they ordered him to join their group?

The sequel leaves no doubt: Atomic energy and their common profession was the tie that linked them.

Haddam and his group would instigate a "Chernobyl" within the Algerian Islamist movement [MIA]. There is no room in their cold strategic calculus for the "Djamaat" and their irrationality.

Haddam's calculus is that of opportunism and thirst for power.

The Abassi-Benhadj antinomy has been superseded by a polarization that will surely lead to implosion of the destructive force that has been at work in Algeria over the last two years.

The arrest by French police of Algerian-born Islamist leaders living in France shows that the Islamist movement there is far from being, or constituting, a solid organization.

The mission of that command post, which looks for all the world like an army general staff headquarters, is to prepare and design targeted propaganda campaigns.

The cell has a substantial budget, in the range of millions of U.S. dollars.

The Chicago cell has been given the function and title of "parliament of the FIS."

Algerian Islamists based in the United States have access to some of the most sophisticated communications equipment.

Alicante

Next in importance after Chicago comes the city of Alicante in Spain. There, Haddam has an installation called the "close proximity operational command post." The mission of this cell is to serve as a relay for communications with Islamist activists inside Algeria.

Personal contacts take place on a regular basis in Mellilia, Nador, and Oujda.

The Spanish cell serves as a transit base for "Afghans" returning to Algeria.

The itinerary is as follows:

Oujda-Berguemt (Morocco), then across the Algero-Moroccan frontier via Sidi Djillali, El Aricha, Sebdou, and Telagh. At Telagh, "Afghans" are taken under the wing of a Saida-based logistics network.

Profiles of those arrested, the documents seized, and reactions of coreligionists in Germany, England, and the United States clearly betray a host of weak points in the overseas organization of the Algerian Islamists.

These weak points are explained by the total absence of a base and the fact that the organization is locked tightly in the sterile and demagogic rhetoric of its origins.

Our investigation has determined that the former FIS still has four operational command posts.

In order of importance Chicago is first, followed by Madrid (Spain), Paris (France), and Berlin (Germany).

Chicago

A Black Muslim stronghold, Chicago today harbors more than 40 Algerian Islamists, in addition to a Middle East community affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist movement.

The Chicago command post is run by Anouar Haddam, a nuclear physicist born in Tlemcen. A former Princeton University student, he stood as a FIS candidate in the 1991 legislative elections.

The men responsible for logistical support are all veteran black-market traffickers.

At every step along the way, Moroccan police and customs officials are "softened up" by baksheesh [bribes]. It may be that high-level Moroccan authorities have no idea what is happening in their country.

The Spanish cell's membership includes procurers and a not insignificant number of drifters with criminal records (drugs) living on the Costa del Sol. Some are well known to Algerian police: Back when Ben Bella was in hiding, they had infiltrated his MDA [Movement for Democracy in Algeria] and served as informers.

Berlin

In Germany, where Rabah Kebir lives with some of Abassi Madani's close collaborators, Algerian Islamists are less active since they lack the necessary base of support.

Kebir maintains close ties to members of the neo-Nazi NSDAP [Nationalist Socialist German Workers' Party], which helps provision it and facilitates acquisition of false identity documents.

Rabah Kebir himself is a rather interesting personality. Passive, vacillating, and unstable, he is regularly denigrated and challenged by Haddam, who accuses him of being a compromiser and advocate of dialogue with the Algerian authorities.

Kebir maintains close ties to Madani's sons, Salman in particular, as well as with Kamedine Kharbane (expelled from France to Pakistan).

Their faction, "the upholders of the oath," was born from a meeting of group leaders in a west Algerian town last spring.

During that meeting, there was a stormy debate, with the Djamaat asserting the lives of too many of their activists had been lost and deploring the activities of the exiled brothers.

Kebir's faction has been marginalized by Haddam, who accuses the Madanis of maintaining a hegemonic grip on the former FIS.

Paris

Dihna Abderrahmane, a physicist who is married with three children (his wife is an oral surgeon), had settled in the small French town of Ferney Voltaire located 2 km from Geneva (Switzerland).

A friend of Haddam, Dihna was the FIS's official representative in France. On Tuesday 9 November at 0600, French police came to his domicile to arrest him, but he fled to Sudan, where he is currently staying.

Dihna's strategy was based on vigilance. Domiciled in France, he worked at the Islamic Center in Eaux Vives, a densely populated quarter of Geneva. The center was controlled by a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and run by the Ramadan family, whose matriarch is the granddaughter of the movement's founder, Hassen El Banna.

Dihna received faxes in Switzerland at the above-mentioned Islamic center and at the mosque of Petit Saconnay, a gathering place for members of the former FIS in exile in Switzerland.

He received instructions directly from Chicago, from Haddam, and relayed them to the French Algerian Fraternity (FAF), which in turn passed messages on to the various prayer halls.

FIS in France

Some 90 percent of Algeria's overseas cultural community resides in France. The former FIS has never succeeded in winning the loyalty of this community.

However, it has succeeded—with the help of non-Algerian Islamists and French converts—in setting up networks.

The Tunisian Nahdah provided safe houses and mail drops (bookstores, prayer halls, etc.). The Federation of French Muslims [FMF] headed by French convert Youssef Leclerc, a personal friend of Abassi, is financed by the World Islamic League (Saudi Arabia). The FMF supplied volunteers for the cause (preparation, printing, and distribution of tracts and magazines).

To date the former FIS has failed to establish itself in France, although it does enjoy the support of a few reactionaries. Much has been said about the "harkis" [members of harkas or native auxiliary contingents of the French Army during Algeria's war for independence], most of it untrue. Harkis still living are at least 55 years old. Despised in both France and Algeria, most are destitute. Their children, at least the great majority of them, have no connection at all with the Islamist movement. They consider themselves part of France's Maghrebian cultural community.

That said, the confiscation of large sums of money at the domiciles of those arrested confirms suspicions that Islamists in France were well funded, enjoying affluent lifestyles that contrasted sharply with the standard of living of the average Maghrebian immigrant.

The former FIS counts some 500 activists living overseas, most of them salaried cadres, plus 1,500 to 2,000 sympathizers. Their principal activity to date has been propaganda—fiery, violent, amateurish propaganda, notable for the absence of rational argument.

Our inquiries with colleagues in the international press, whose response reflected solidarity with Algerian journalists, indicate that overseas the former FIS, lacking a popular base in the Algerian cultural community or a convincing propaganda line, is smoldering with violent discord between the MIA and the former FIS triggered by the abduction of the three Frenchmen in Algiers—discord that threatens to explode into the open. Iran allegedly proffered its good offices in an effort to avert this explosion.

Added to strains within the Islamist movement are personal rivalries and a probable struggle for supremacy among the various terrorist groups. On the ground, rivalry between the MIA and the Djamaate (FIS groups aligned with Abassi) is quite open.

Pasqua's Message

Juridically, the French Republic is fully within its rights to take action to protect the security of persons and property.

Politically, Charles Pasqua is sending a clear and multidirectional message not only to Islamists around the world but also to extremists of every kind, Europeans included.

The message is a warning: The rules of hospitality in France and elsewhere require that guests of the host country respect certain obligations and responsibilities.

Two imams—a Turk who officiated at services in Nantua and was behind the recent Islamic "scarf" [foulard] affair, and a Moroccan officiating at Carpentras—have been expelled from France to their country of origin. Again, the message was clear: French laws will be enforced; which is not in any sense inconsistent with freedom of religious practice in France.

To avoid driving authentic Muslim believers into alliance with Islamists who use religion for political ends, Pasqua has reaffirmed his respect, and that of the French Government, for France's Muslim community. The government's actions were taken in response to the assassination of two Frenchmen and the abduction of three others.

FAF's publications called for murder and violence. Banned, they will continue in other forms.

Footnote

1. Mr. Sari's assassins were killed by security forces later in the year.

Attack at Sidi Ghiles Prison Described

94AF0053C Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 30 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Yacine Lahcene: "Sidi Ghiles Prison Attacked"]

[Text] The terrorist cell, consisting of three armed individuals, was apparently well organized, whatever else one may think of it. It was about 1800 and night was just beginning to fall. The streets near the penitentiary were virtually deserted. At that time of day, in that part of town, passersby are very rare. The presence of anyone, even strangers behaving suspiciously, would thus attract no attention.

The prison guard, an accomplice, waited for a sign from his confederates. At the appointed hour, he opened the prison gate and let the three terrorists inside. Obviously, the guard must have given his partners a detailed map of the prison in advance. With their pinpoint knowledge of the premises, they

proceeded first to the office of the warden, who was taken by surprise and failed to react quickly enough. They rushed him and—to avoid making noise—fell on him with knives. With serious wounds in the throat and elsewhere on his body, the warden collapsed on the floor of his office in a pool of blood. According to the latest information we have obtained, the victim is still in extremely critical condition. One crime already behind them, the group proceeded with the guard in the lead to the facility's armory, carrying off six pistols, an equal number of "mat 49" and Seminovs. Armed with all these weapons—the principal motive for the attack—the terrorists and the guard took flight.

While the facts about this attack discredit recently circulated rumors about a spectacular prison breakout of some 200 prisoners, they do confirm that the Cherchell prison was indeed the target of a terrorist operation.

Also, we have learned the prosecutor in Saida was seriously wounded yesterday in a terrorist attack.

Thus we see terrorists are again targeting officers of the court. Other magistrates brought down by the beastly terrorists include Lardi Baida, deputy prosecutor for the court of Algiers, assassinated last July; Mohamed Said, prosecutor general of Tlemcen, victim of a terrorist attack last May; and Bekai Mustapha, presiding judge for the court at Kolea.

Indeed, the attack on Sidi Ghiles prison and attempted assassination of Said's prosecutor were part of an almost synchronized recrudescence of terrorist attacks throughout the country.

In several cities, a number of civilians and members of security forces were assassinated between last Tuesday and Sunday: no less than 21 civilians, including a forest ranger, his eight-year-old daughter, a clerk, the president of the Guigbab DEC [expansion unknown] (Merouana), and an imam. The security services are mourning the loss of 14 of their men, including nine policemen savagely murdered last Wednesday at Benghazi while trying to remove a police roadblock. Two other policemen were wounded in that ambush. Nevertheless, the security services have struck back with some effective blows against the terrorists in the space of only a few days, eliminating 12 and arresting 149 others.

The biggest raid was carried out on Tuesday at Tiarat, where five terrorists were killed and 46 others rendered harmless, while in the Sidi Bel Abbas region seven members of the group that set fire to the ENIE [expansion not given] at Telagh were neutralized.

These results demonstrate once again that despite the relentlessness and murderous fury of the armed groups, the security services are more determined than ever to wage unceasing battle against them.

General Strike in Rouiba Reported

94AF0053D Algiers LIBERTE in French 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Zoubir Ferroukhi: "28,000 Workers To Strike on 6 December"—first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] Phase two of the Rouiba unionists' action plan to win acceptance of their demands: First came the sit-in, now they have served notice of a strike.

Feelings boiled over this time, and the trade unions of Rouiba passed from words into action: a general strike. Top union officials from the Rouiba industrial zone required little time at their meeting yesterday to decide to serve notice of a one-day strike to be held on 6 December. If no concrete progress is made toward satisfying union demands (see LIBERTE of 26 October and 20 November 1993) within the next two weeks, some 28,000 workers will down tools. In a nutshell, immobilization of the Rouiba industrial zone will also paralyze such enormous economic entities as CVI (industrial vehicles), SNTR [National Highway Transport Company], SNTV [National Passenger Transport Company], Naftal-Distribution, ENIPEC (hides and leather), ENEL [National Electric Power Board], and ENATB [expansion not given].

Warning signs that a strike was ahead have been building for some time now, so the move took no one by surprise. Over the last few months (nine months, to be precise), a handful of issues—no more than five or six—have dragged on unresolved, even though the whole lot of them could have been settled in less time than it took union representatives yesterday to vote for a strike.

What they decided was to stage a thrice-postponed "solidarity" general strike, basically to demand that the "dialogue" between the social partners (labor and management) be more than a polite fiction.

Workers and union representatives have been laid off at INDEFOC (training), ERWA (salvage), INFRAFER (railroad infrastructure), Hydrotechnique, and one or two smaller enterprises. UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] representatives have held that these layoffs were unjustified and improper. The national syndicate brought the matter to the general inspectorate for labor, which has acknowledged unionists' complaints were well founded. Overall, the inspectorate opined that the layoffs were not justified, at the same time serving notice that efforts by management to intimidate or harass served only to expose their incompetence. On several occasions the inspectorate demanded, in vain, that sanctions be lifted and personnel rehired. Spurred to action by the syndicate's national leadership, the ministries concerned ended by sending faxes directly to the enterprises under their jurisdiction, urging them to act immediately to resolve the disputes. This was the situation as it stood a day or two before 2 November.

On that date, at the sit-in held by 500 to 600 Rouiba unionists at People's House (site of UGTA headquarters), Mr. Sidi Said, UGTA's national secretary for social affairs and top conflict resolution expert, claimed victory too soon when he happily announced news of the ministerial directives. But the unionists quietly dispersed, trusting completely in the promises of the authorities as relayed to them by national syndicate officials. By yesterday, however, no further progress had been made toward resolving this handful of issues. And of course the workers, or at least their representatives in the industrial zone, believe they were "taken in" for too long. Mr. Sidi Said called it a "provocation." Indeed. Even so, the unionists, including those in the most moderate wing of the UGTA, have not fully appreciated the significance of the fact that these relatively simple layoff disputes have not been resolved as rapidly as issues much thornier were in the past.

One might also ask, in the context of Algeria's current situation, whose interests are being served by pushing UGTA out of its high-level role as instigator and articulator of proposals for economic recovery and social peace and miring it down in petty, secondary issues. Along the same lines, one wonders whether driving nails into the coffin of some sector of an economy already in its death throes might tend not only to discredit the UGTA but also to exacerbate social tensions, adding fuel to the fire.

That said, it must be noted that not all the news is bad: Within the Rouiba industrial zone, some enterprises deserve kudos for good management and for maintaining good communications between the social partners.

Import Policy for High Potato Prices Criticized

94AF0053E Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
13 Nov 93 p 3

[Article: "Potatoes: Imports No Solution"]

[Text] In the coming days, some 25,000 tons of potatoes imported by ENAFLA and ENAFROID [expansions not given] will inundate the fruit and vegetable markets. This, essentially, was the burden of a communique Tuesday from the Ministry of Economic Affairs saying that arrival of the foreign potatoes would facilitate a reduction in current prices for this truck-garden product so popular with Algerians.

Discussing the intolerable increase in the price of potatoes—in recent days it has stood at about 30 Algerian dinars per kilogram—the ministry communique noted that retail prices charged by fruit and vegetable merchants are "not subject to controls." According to the ministry communique, "only recourse to imports could influence the market situation in terms of normalizing prices."

Self-Sufficiency?

Well, if resorting to potato imports was the only solution to the above-noted overheating, why did they wait three months to do it? Especially since the decision was actually made on 1 August. Even back then, potatoes were selling for 20 dinars per kilogram, and the need to flood the market to influence prices was being felt.

Looming behind all these questions linked to the delay in provisioning and normalizing markets is the problem of self-sufficiency: Is Algeria actually capable of implementing a program of potato cultivation that would meet demand? Officials have talked ceaselessly in the last two agricultural seasons of big projects designed to end importation of potatoes for consumption, above all imports of seed potatoes. Looking to external markets for food is costing our country millions of dollars. This is why the Ministry of Agriculture has made intensified cultivation of certain strategic crops (seed potatoes, industrial tomatoes, certain grains, etc.) a categorical priority.

In potatoes, for example, the stated goal was a permanent end to imports. However, after awhile the ministry indicated that "the road was still long before we reach real agricultural take-off," despite the "incentives to production" approved for strategic crops.

Eating Seed!

Unlike last year, when Algeria did not resort to potato imports, we now find ourselves unable to do without them.

The skyrocketing prices, caused in large part by speculation during the interval between successive crop seasons, could not have been tolerated any longer. Household budgets were being hit too hard.

But the soaring prices for this tuber, which became a popular dish because people of modest means could always afford it, cannot hide the dangerous phenomenon that has become more pronounced during this period of tension.

Seed potatoes, normally used to meet growers' needs for the current agricultural season, have been diverted to consumption. In the last three weeks, and in more than one case, the potatoes that ordinary citizens were buying in fruit and vegetable markets for 30 dinars a kilogram were actually seed potatoes, for which the officially decreed price is 10.5 dinars.

'Scandalized'

Reports from CASSAP [agricultural supply cooperative] in Cheraga, COPSEM in Staoueli, and COPASSAD [expansions not given] in Zeralda—three institutions responsible for provisioning farmers and especially for meeting seed requirements—show that demand for seed potatoes has been high for some time. The COPSEM official says that unlike last year, when his cooperative was left with 3,000 tons of unsold seed potatoes, this year—in the early vegetable program alone—his organization has already delivered 900 tons more than projected, without even meeting all the demand.

Our interlocutors, while not pointing the finger of blame at anyone in particular, declared themselves scandalized by the idea of seed potatoes finding their way into the market stalls.

We would remind readers that our country requires about 125,000 to 130,000 tons of seed potatoes per year.

In the last two seasons, these needs were met by Algerian produce.

This saved the country valuable foreign exchange. But if there is not enough seed to meet the needs of the agricultural season now under way because it has been marketed to households, potato production may decline as a result of market pressures over the next few months. The early vegetables program is already somewhat behind schedule.

ISRAEL

Alternative Palestinian Agreement Offered

94AA0019C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (24-Hour Supplement) in Hebrew 29 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Rafi Eytan]

[Text] Is there a chance that the agreement of principals will hold up? Is there a chance that the result will bring about stability in the system of relations between Israel and the Palestinians? In my estimation, no.

The agreement of principals was signed with 'Arafat alone, and 'Arafat does not have a majority on this issue in the Palestinian National Council. Most of the Palestinian organizations represented in it, including significant parts of Fatah, are opposed to the agreement of principals and stand for a continuation of the armed struggle against Israel, in accordance to the Palestinian Convention. They all have a smashing majority in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, especially among the young generation, which is the leader. A new generation has arisen that cannot reconcile with a co-existence with Israel, even in the borders of the Green Line.

Most of them are steeped in, and believe in, the righteousness of the Palestinian Convention as it is, without change.

'Arafat, as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), succeeded in surviving only by right of compromises with the extremists in his camp. In other words, he enabled them to continue on a practical, extremist line and did not go out against them with weapons. He cannot and would not want to absolutely prevent terrorist acts. We saw how he operated in Lebanon at the end of the 1970's and the early 1980's: The PLO reached a series of repeatedly changing agreements on co-existence with the Christians and Shi'ites; 'Arafat did not honor a single one of them. There is no reason that he would change his ways now.

The future Palestinian police, whose job it will be to preserve the peace and the citizens of Israel, according to that which is indicated up to now, will be comprised of a loyal section of the Palestinian population. That is, there will also be elements that formally or informally belong to extremist camps. To this day, these elements have few weapons, and, despite this, the acts of terrorism and shootings are relatively many. The weapons that will be given to the Palestinian police will increase their arsenal, intentionally as well—under the guidance of Yasir 'Arafat, in order to preserve his position, as well as by officers and individuals in the police—because of organizational or emotional involvement with terrorist organizations, as well as by means of acquisition or theft.

Under these conditions, how will the economic vision of the architect of the agreement of principals, Shim'on Peres, be realized, when Israeli businessmen who will have to meet colleagues in Ramallah or Gaza will have to risk their lives?

And on the matter of the settlers. The settlers of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza district, by the authority of the decisions of the governments of the left and right, feel that they are in danger. Our sages of blessed memory said that the duty of saving life overrides everything, and from the aspect of one who sees himself as a potential sacrifice—he overrides democracy as well as the "rule of law." Anyone who feels that his life is forsaken in any case will be astonished—where is the law [sentence as published]. The settlers, who suddenly stand before a wave of hatred, whose barricades were burst in the wake of the agreement of principals, cannot not avoid defending themselves. It should be remembered that the Israel Defense Forces is also made up of fathers and sons whose position on Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza district is not necessarily that of the Israeli government. If so, Israel is at risk of a civil war.

All of these factors, and many others, when they accumulate at the moment of crisis, like around the division of Jerusalem or the removal of a settlement or a severe attack, have no chance that they will make possible the realization of the agreement as it stands.

So, what is the solution? In the situation that has been created, it seems to me that the only possible solution is "the separation of the mosaic." The Israeli Government must adopt the slogan that every Jew, wherever, "is holy, holy in his place, and his land is holy." That which was holy to al-Sadat in the Sinai, is all the more holy to us in the land of Israel. The agreement must be undermined, and, in the event that it cannot be reached, it must be effected unilaterally. Leaving under Israeli sovereignty all of the Jewish

settlements, including open access roads. By a rough calculation, we are speaking of about 3,500 square km for the autonomy and about 2,500 for complete Israeli rule. There would be a separation between them, and a fence if need be, giving Palestinians free passage to adjacent countries and between different regions. This is a hard separation, necessitating efforts and the investment of resources, but, in my estimation, only this can succeed, and only it should be achieved on the basis of a national consensus.

The writer is one of the leaders of the intelligence community.

Council To Promote EC Business Opportunities Formed

94AA0019A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (24-Hour Supplement) in Hebrew 28 Nov 93 p 14

[Article by Navit Zomer]

[Text] At a festive dinner, which was held in Brussels during the weekend, the establishment of an economic European-Israeli council was announced. The council will work along with Common Market institutions, and its role will be to promote and assist in the economic affairs of the Israeli business sector in the Common Market.

The initiative to establish the Israeli-European council is that of the coordination bureau of the economic organizations in Israel. The council will be headed by two chairmen—the Israeli one will be Dan Proper, president of the coordination bureau and president of the Industrialists' Association. Dani Gillerman, president of the Society of Commerce Bureaus, will serve as his deputy. The European chairman has yet to be selected.

The council's administration will include 12 members who are representatives of economic organizations and representatives of the business world from Israel, and 12 additional ones from among the Common Market countries.

The council, which will serve as a sort of lobby to promote Israel's dealings in the market and vice versa, will open its office in Brussels, and a portion of the financing of its activities will be executed by institutions of the European Community (EC).

Present at the festive meal in Brussels were Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres; Common Market President Jacques Delors, who welcomed its establishment; Dan Proper; Yoram Blizovski, director-general of the Industrialists' Association; and Marcel Shaton—Israel's commerce representative in Brussels.

The leadership of the Industrialists' Association stayed in Brussels for three days for talks with representatives of the Common Market and administrators.

"We feared a significant change in mood toward us," Proper related upon his return. "The market revealed a willingness for a series of benefits for Israel's position. Among other things, we reached an understanding on the subject of their extremist declaration regarding the disgrace of the Arab boycott," he added.

Outlook for Economic Growth in Region Detailed

94AA0019E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 30 Nov 93 p 15

[Article by Sever Plotzger]

[Text] Time is working against them. Against the Arab Middle East, our neighbors. The changeover of the

economy of the liberal market—which started Asia and is currently promoting South America to its spot—passed over the Middle East.

In Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, the same elite dominate who dominated 15 years ago, with the same outdated and fossilized perception of the world.

Even in Egypt, an undesirable process of retreating from the modernistic ideas ("the open-door policy") of Anwar al-Sadat has begun.

Husni Mubarak is more cautious, more conservative.

It is likely that the guilt lies with the oil. The abundance of oil has created, in all of the Arab Middle East, the delusion of easy money. Why make the effort, compete, be enterprising, if, anyhow, the desert land is saturated with black gold?

But the demand for oil has shrunk, a little in the beginning, and now, very much—and the producing countries, with the exception of the shining Gulf emirates, have begun shortages and moderation.

And it is likely that the guilt lies with the Muslim hostility to the West. The regimes in the Arab countries around us, especially in large portions of the public opinion there, are closing themselves up in a conceptual and cultural bubble that repels the "Western" economic ideas as "unsuitable" to the Arab-Muslim uniqueness.

Asia began to flourish when it became freed from the feeling of isolationism and opened to the world; this is happening now in South America and Eastern Europe. This is not yet happening in the Middle Eastern Arab world.

The longer the Arab Middle East continued to cook in its own juices, the further it got from the unavoidable economic decisions, and it sunk in hostility and pollution.

The result: Regression and regression once again.

Recently, with the aid of a number of friends from the Middle East Department of the World Bank in Washington, I made a comparison between the economic strength of Arab countries and that of Israel, from the years 1977 to 1992.

What happened in the 15 years between al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Oslo accord?

The answer: Israel has become an economic Middle East superpower, which puts all of the countries surrounding it in a deep shadow, all of them together, including Iraq.

And these are the data:

In 1977, the domestic product of the three countries hostile to Israel—Jordan, Syria, and Iraq—was \$27.4 billion. Egypt had a product of an additional \$12.1 in the same year, and, in all, the domestic product of the four Arab countries came to \$40 billion in that year.

Israel had a domestic product of only \$10 billion in 1977.

The joint economic strength of the four most important Arab countries next to us—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan—was four times that of Israel's economic strength 15 years ago.

In 1992, the domestic product of the three countries hostile to Israel—Jordan, Syria, and Iraq—was \$27.7 billion. That

is, their current product did not grow at all, despite inflation and despite the 50-percent increase in population.

Egypt had a product of \$30 billion in 1992. The total product of the four Arab countries reached \$58 billion last year.

Israel alone had a product valued at \$67 billion in 1992. Our economic strength rose by 20 percent over the joint strength of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.

The Israeli economy is more than three times greater than the economies of Syria and Jordan, and more than double the joint economies of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.

This vast gap to our benefit stands out even more when one looks at the product per capita, the accepted indicator of productivity and prosperity.

The growth of the product in current dollars also includes the inflation and devaluation components of the local currency. In real terms, only Egypt has succeeded, since 1977, in maintaining the economic prosperity of its residents. In the other three Arab countries, the real product per capita declined—between 10 percent (in Jordan) to 70 percent (in Iraq). In Israel, the real product increased by 50 percent per capita. These economic developments have strategic and political ramifications:

- Even when all of the defense expenditures of Israel are limited to 12 percent of the domestic product, they cost at least five to six times—and perhaps even 10 times—more than the defense expenditures of Jordan and Syria together (Iraq does not currently have measured defense expenditures).
- There is no apparent danger to Israel's survival or even a real military risk from the "eastern coalition" of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. The clear economic weakness of these three countries has turned them into dwarfs opposite Israel. This is a situation which is unlikely to change before the year 2015.
- The only chance for the Arab countries near us to get on the track of rapid economic growth is a change in perception and method: A sharp transition to the economics of a liberal, competitive, open market.

Except that such a transition invites democracy—and this, from the point of view of the traditional Arab regimes, is the problem.

There is no other model of economic success except for a developing competitive and democratic market.

**Domestic Product of Israel and Nearby Arab Countries
(in billions of dollars)**

	1977	1992
Iraq	18.3	9.3
Syria	7.1	14.5
Israel	10.0	67.0
Jordan	2.1	3.9
Egypt	12	30.0

The Arab countries have been learning this from experience during the past 15 years. Even though the population grew from 60 million residents to 88 million residents, they lost the economic race with Israel and retreated far behind.

Have they learned something?

INDIA

Reportage, Comment on U.S. Stand on Kashmir

Raphel Briefing Reported

94AS0075A Madras THE HINDU in English 30 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "U.S. Questions Kashmir's Status as Part of India"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Washington, Oct. 29. The entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is a "disputed" territory and Washington does not recognise that the State's accession to India in 1947 as meaning that "Kashmir is forevermore an integral part of India," says a high level official of the Clinton Administration. The official was briefing, on background, reporters from the sub-continent here late on Thursday.

In a series of troubling remarks on Kashmir, the official, a key decision-maker in the administration on South Asian policy, declared that the Shimla agreement signed by India and Pakistan in 1972 may no longer be an effective instrument for resolving the Kashmir dispute: "It is 21 years old and there have been very few discussions, if any, under that accord in terms of resolving the Kashmir dispute." The official argued that "by definition, *ipso facto*, it has not been very effective."

The remarks of the Clinton administration official now complete the comprehensive reversal of the more even-handed approach on Kashmir outlined by the Bush administration in 1990. In a Congressional hearing in 1990, the Bush administration declared that the Shimla Agreement had superseded the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir.

Responding to the popular concerns in India about the remarks of Mr. Clinton on Kashmir last month at the United Nations, the official said that "it was not a signal to suggest there is a secret U.S. diplomatic strategy to insert itself as a mediator in the Kashmir dispute." Saying that Kashmir is on the American radar screen along with Yugoslavia, Somalia and the former Soviet Union, the official pointed out that it is not easy to overlook the Kashmir problem.

Ready to Mediate

On the question of American role in Kashmir, the official said although the Clinton Administration is not now putting itself forward as a mediator, it is willing to do so, "if all the parties to the dispute want it." The official left the reporters in no doubt that Washington considers the Kashmiris an indispensable element of any settlement of the Kashmir dispute. "There is no way any resolution can be stable and lasting unless agreed to by the people of Kashmir," said the official.

Confirming the Indian suspicions that Washington is not averse to internationalising the Kashmir dispute, the official said the United States is now set to engage Russia in a formal consultation on South Asia. The senior administration official, who is visiting Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan next week, is also travelling to Moscow to consider the development of joint initiatives with Russia on conflict resolution in South Asia.

On the question of Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir, Washington had put a lot of pressure on Islamabad to end such activity, according to the official. "Our view is that there seems to be less of that going on now." Whatever, the external support to militancy in Kashmir, according to the official "there are very strong indigenous elements to that insurgency." The official also declared the apparently new American assessment of the insurgency in Kashmir, that it is "really self-sustaining."

The remarks of the American official suggest that the recent Indian initiatives to set up a Human Rights Commission and the offer of the Indian Prime Minister to open a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir have been the result of sustained American prodding. Washington has pushed the government of India "very hard to clean up their act."

Washington has demanded that the Government of India needs to "make the security forces accountable for their own behaviour." "Making people disappear, encountered killings, extra-judicial executions, death in custody, all this stuff, frankly, there is no excuse for it. Insurgency is not an excuse for that kind of activity and behaviour on the part of security forces."

On India's offer to discuss issues related to Kashmir with Pakistan, the official pointed out that Washington had been encouraging India and Pakistan to engage in a serious discussion on Kashmir. The administration official revealed that the United States was "pushing diplomatically" in the run up to the elections in Pakistan that India "must turn over a new leaf" when a new Government takes over in Pakistan.

The official regretted that the stand-off at Hazratbal has come as an unexpected impediment to the renewal of Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir. Urging restraint on all sides, the official said the United States is encouraged by the Indian decision not to storm the shrine, and called on Pakistan not to exacerbate the situation by making provocative statements.

Responding to a question on the growing anger in the Indian public opinion on the American intervention in Kashmir, the official stated that such public perceptions do not negate the broadening and deepening of the Indo-U.S. relationship. She pointed out that "the Indian Government and Parliament have come to recognise that their own perceptions of the standard of human rights was not being met" in Kashmir.

Solarz's Remarks

In a related development, the remarks on Kashmir by Mr. Steven Solarz, the nominee of President Clinton to be the new Ambassador to India are likely to cause some anguish in India. At a meeting with a group of Indian parliamentarians organised by a Washington think-tank, Mr. Solarz raised the hypothetical question of the impact on India's stability in the event Kashmir were allowed to secede. He referred to the two alternative views, one stressing the damaging consequences to Indian unity, and the other suggesting Kashmir is a unique problem, the separation of which is unlikely to affect the unity of India. Although posed in the form of an academic question, it may provide some clues to the emerging mindset in the Clinton administration on Kashmir.

The rather sharp presentation of its views on Kashmir by the Clinton administration leaves no room for fudging and finessing in New Delhi. New Delhi's belief that incremental concessions to the United States on key issues could buy a more cooperative attitude from the Clinton Administration has been, clearly, a dangerous illusion. India is on its own in Kashmir. The Government in New Delhi needs to demonstrate that it has the determination and tenacity to defend India's basic national interests.

Raphel Remarks Protested

94AS0075B Madras THE HINDU in English 30 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "Protest Over Remarks Conveyed to U.S."; boldface words as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 29. Taken aback by the stridency of the latest note struck by Washington on Kashmir—that it does not recognise the State's accession to India—New Delhi today conveyed its protest and anguish to the U.S. What particularly upset the Government of India was the attitude on issues with a close bearing on the territorial integrity of India. The acting head of the U.S. mission, Mr. Kenneth Brill, who was called to the Foreign office by the Joint Secretary in charge of America, Mr. Haridip Puri, was told of India's concern.

In an aide memoire given to the U.S., India took strong exception to Washington's "studied tilt" towards Pakistan, as contained in the background briefing of the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms. Robin Raphel to South Asian journalists based in Washington. The perception in Pakistan of a considered U.S. tilt, it was pointed out, would not be a helpful factor for the commencement of a dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, for which the U.S. had been playing a useful and constructive role.

The backgrounder, official sources said, contained elements which were most disconcerting because of their fundamental and direct bearing on India's vital interest. The aide memoire, according to sources, regretted Ms. Raphel's remark, questioning the "status" of Jammu and Kashmir, a stand never taken by Washington in the past.

India drew the U.S. Government's attention to the drastic legal and political implications of not recognising the accession of Jammu and Kashmir. Did the U.S. intend to question the territorial integrity of India and reopen the issue of the accession of the erstwhile Princely States? Ms. Raphel's briefing, according to the Indian Government, would certainly be regarded by the public as biased and tendentious and not in harmony with the Indo-U.S. relations.

Ill-timed: India's regret was all the greater because Ms. Raphel's statement came at a time when Jammu and Kashmir was in the grip of a complicated situation. A delicate exercise was on to persuade the terrorists to leave the Hazratbal shrine, and initiatives were on for reopening the dialogue with Pakistan on all sensitive issues of mutual concern. Her downplaying of Pakistan's role in instigating insurgency in Kashmir was also regarded as a matter of concern. This attitude was seen as running counter to the political understanding that marked the Indo-U.S. exchanges.

One-sided public statements of the type made by Ms. Raphel, it was felt, would only encourage obdurate elements. The aide memoire was believed to have found Ms. Raphel's remark out of tune with the recent diplomatic exchanges, especially between the Foreign Secretary, Mr. J. N. Dixit and the U.S. Under Secretary of Political Affairs, Mr. Tarnoff. Diplomatic circles, which were agog with the talk on the subject, ascribed her comments to her inexperience.

Fresh dimension: Two days ago, Ms. Raphel, while repeating an earlier formulation—that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory—elaborated that the U.S. did not recognise the State's accession in 1947 and as such, did not regard it as forever an integral part of India. This gave a disturbing dimension to what, so far, was considered, at the most the U.S. adherence to a technicality.

At one stage, when a senior Cabinet Minister conveyed to the External Affairs Ministry his worry over the U.S. description of the "entire" State as a disputed territory, he was told that Pakistan should have a bigger reason to be upset as the areas controlled by it too were sought to be covered by the "dispute." Ms. Raphel's comment would strengthen doubts about U.S. evenhandedness.

Some in the U.S. may well argue that its stand, as spelt out now, was all along implied in its stated position and, hence, there was no departure or a new tilt. However, it was one thing to say that the State or the "entire" State was a disputed territory or to suggest that its accession to India was not valid or that it was not to be regarded forever as part of India. Does it mean that the U.S. now did not see any use for the ambiguity, consciously maintained in the past for purposes of diplomatic flexibility?

Doubts over Shimla Pact: Equally surprising now were the strong doubts over the efficacy of the Shimla Agreement as an instrument for resolving the Kashmir problem. Three years ago, the U.S. swore by the Shimla Agreement which, it was stated, had superseded the U.N. resolutions of 1949 and 1950. Of late, however, doubts began to be expressed on its efficacy on the plea that its framework had not been put to use for over 20 years. Simultaneously, the U.S. began to refer to the need for "taking into account the views of the Kashmiri people." There was thus, a switch—from support to bilateralism, incorporated in the Shimla Agreement to what may be loosely called trilateralism. Significantly, the U.S. also sought to project itself as a potential mediator, of course, with one qualification—"if that is desired by both sides."

The latest remarks from Washington pointed to a continuing U.S. interest, though what shape it could take was not clear. According to Ms. Raphel, the cost of the Kashmir dispute was "unacceptably high" and "it is time to look at the cost of this dispute in human terms and in budgetary terms.... in 1993." At another stage, she said the U.S. would consider a mediating role if it were requested by all relevant parties, but "we are not putting ourselves forward at this time as mediators."

The U.S. President, Mr. Clinton's reference to Kashmir, it was explained, was meant to convey that "we see Kashmir on our radar screen, along with Yugoslavia, Somalia and

parts of the former Soviet Union where there is a civil conflict." However "it was not a signal to suggest a secret U.S. strategy" on Kashmir.

Gains neutralised?: The U.S. position, as enunciated by her, now went far beyond what was stated some four months ago by a visiting official, Mr. John Mallot. His utterances led to sharp attacks on him, leading him to complain that the messenger was sought to be shot for the message. Then followed a conscious bid to undo the resultant damage to the Indo-U.S. relations. Mr. Dixit went to Washington along with a group of officials for comprehensive talks. The gains of that mission may be neutralised now.

Ms. Raphael's comments, ironically, came in the wake of steps that ought to have met the U.S. concerns—like the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, and the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao's offer to talk on all issues, including those related to Kashmir.

Congress-I Reaction

94AS0075C Madras *THE HINDU* in English 31 Oct 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "U.S. View Unacceptable, Says Congress"]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 30. The Congress(I) today officially said the U.S. view, as reflected in the remarks of a senior State Department official made known yesterday, questioning the accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 was "incomprehensible and totally unacceptable."

But the Congress reaction released to the media by its spokesman, Mr. Chandulal Chandrakar, also pointed out that India's reaction would be "balanced" as "we are a mature country."

The Congress release said the kind of statement that had been made in Washington adversely affects Indo-U.S. bilateral relations and was "best avoided."

The following is the text of the two-paragraph Congress statement:

"It is a matter of profound regret that a senior official of the State Department of the U.S. should have questioned the accession of Kashmir to India in 1947. We find this attitude incomprehensible and totally unacceptable.

"We hope that the latest pronouncement reflects the views of an individual and not the U.S. Government. We are a mature country and our response will be balanced. At the same time we cannot but point out that statements of this nature adversely affect Indo-U.S. bilateral relations and are best avoided."

While the ruling party has kept to a middle-of-the-road formulation in a relatively adverse situation, senior members of the union Cabinet have noted that the latest developments in relation to Kashmir have not been brought before the highest council of the Government.

The U.S. Government statement on Kashmir, which has caused consternation all round in the country, was available here yesterday morning, but was not even referred to in the Cabinet meeting held at 7 p.m.

Nor for that matter was the interim order of a division bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court asking the

Government to allow food inside Hazratbal, and restore water and electricity to the shrine. The Court's direction tends to negate the very logic of the siege of Hazratbal laid by the Army to flush out armed terrorists, including foreign mercenaries.

Cabinet sources said individual Ministers were not always expected to have details of every new development that might have occurred in the course of a day, especially in a pre-election situation.

'Unwarranted Pressure'

94AS0075D Madras *THE HINDU* in English 1 Nov 93 p 8

[Editorial: "Unwarranted Pressure"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The substance and tone of the remarks made on Thursday in Washington by a senior Clinton administration official who deals with South Asia has brought home the uncomfortable reality that American policy in the region is becoming increasingly interventionist and that such interventionism does not augur well for India. Under the guise of "conflict resolution" which has become one of the new buzzwords of the Clinton administration's largely amateurish effort to stay "engaged" in America's self-prescribed "manifest destiny" to lead the post Cold War world, U.S. policy in the region is becoming less and less apologetic about an activist role in the arena. The Clinton administration's "creative diplomacy" in South Asia which seems to have no pretensions to any other interest except to strap the region into some kind of nuclear non-proliferation regime translates into sustained pressure on India and Pakistan to "come to the table." This can only result in a substantial erosion of sovereignty in decision-making for both countries.

The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms. Robin Raphael's questioning of Kashmir's status as an integral part of India might not really be the key indicator of the discernible tilt in policy against India, given that all Washington's pronouncements have had the in-built premise that Kashmir is disputed territory. That the U.S. regards part or all of Kashmir as disputed is not so much a point of issue, given the undeniable historical reality that Kashmir's status was the subject of U.N. resolutions, but what is of concern is the marked hardening of the U.S. attitude towards India's position in the dispute, including a hint of an intervention in the problem that will not be in India's interest.

There are three new elements that stand out in Ms. Raphael's presentation that are the critical indicators of the tilt against India. The first is an unsubstantiated assertion that Pakistan's support in fuelling the militancy in the Valley is not as much as it used to be. Not only would this formulation give greater credibility to the claim that the stir in the Valley is wholly spontaneous and indigenous, but it would reinforce the attempts from across the border to keep the militancy "spontaneous." The second disturbing element is that in a shift from the stand of the Bush administration the Clinton administration now appears to be questioning the efficacy of the Shimla Agreement. Until now, the American emphasis on Shimla had implied an acceptance of India's argument that Kashmir was an issue to be resolved bilaterally. Another indication of the U.S.

interest in internationalising Kashmir is the suggestion that America will sound out Russia on a joint initiative for conflict resolution in South Asia.

The Narasimha Rao administration appears to have been taken by surprise by the unfriendly tenor of these remarks, especially because it has in recent months tried to respond to American and international pressure by setting up a human rights commission and also indicating a willingness to talk to Pakistan on Kashmir. But what the Government has not perhaps taken into account is that precisely because it took these steps only under pressure and is perceived to be amenable to this sort of pressure, does Washington find it tactically rewarding to turn up the heat.

As we had said earlier in these columns, India's position on Kashmir is becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the continuing inability to initiate a political process in the State, the sharpening perception of the Indian State as an alien oppressor, reinforced by the image of the Army laying siege to the religious symbols of the Kashmiri people. But most troubling is New Delhi's reluctance to accept the reality that the only way to take Kashmir off the world's radar screen is to engage Islamabad in a mutual confidence building exercise so that an insecure regime in Pakistan does not feel compelled to invite external mediators in, at the cost of the region's sovereignty.

Further Comment, Analysis on U.S. Stand

'A Dangerous Volte-Face'

94AS0076A Madras THE HINDU in English 3 Nov 93 p 8

[Article by Prem Shankar Jha; quotation marks, italicized words as published]

[Text] U.S. officials may swear till they are blue in the face that the statements made by the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms. Robin Raphel on Kashmir, do not spell any change in the U.S.' policy towards Kashmir. But no subsequent clarification can change the fact that Ms. Raphel's remarks constitute the most dramatic and inexplicable turnabout in U.S. foreign policy since the Clinton administration came to power. It is not impossible that Ms. Raphel did not mean to question the validity of the Instrument of Accession, but despite being inundated with queries from Washington think tanks and newspapers all over the world, the U.S. State department has not issued a contradiction. Policy makers in New Delhi have no option but to take Ms. Raphel's statement seriously and fathom the motives behind it.

The shift has not really been sudden. Ms. Raphel started several weeks ago by saying that the U.S. considered the whole of Kashmir a disputed territory. She has since elaborated that the U.S. no longer considered the Simla agreement a valid basis for the settlement of the dispute. In support of this she cited the fact that there had been very few discussions under the agreement in the last 20 years. At this point observers in India assumed that the U.S. was considering reviving the U.N. resolutions of 1948, which proposed a plebiscite in the State once peace had been restored. But in her latest briefing Ms Raphel has broken entirely new ground.

The U.N. resolutions envisaged only two choices for the people of Kashmir, whether to belong to Pakistan or India.

If Ms. Raphel's briefing truly reflects government policy, the U.S. has explicitly delinked itself from that resolution. It now believes that the Kashmiris must have the right to choose independence if they so wish. What is more this right must be exercised by the people in the whole of the princely state of Kashmir, i.e., both Jammu and Kashmir and 'Azad Kashmir,' including Gilgit, and the other areas that Pakistan has already explicitly annexed.

The possibility can no longer be ruled out, therefore that the U.S. is now questioning the validity of the Instrument of Accession that made Kashmir part of India because it would not mind seeing a fourth nation in the subcontinent, carved out of bits of India and Pakistan. If this is indeed so, Ms. Raphel's remark questioning the accession was only undiplomatic and not inaccurate.

What is genuinely surprising about the above stance is its illogicality. To begin with, it is simply not true that the U.S. did not accept India's sovereignty over not only present day Jammu and Kashmir but over the whole of the original princely state as it existed in 1947. During the Security Council debate in April-May 1948, the U.S. permanent Representative, Warren Austin stated categorically that with the signature of the Instrument of Accession sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir passed from Maharaja Hari Singh to the government of India... That was why, he said, it was India that had come to the U.N. as the petitioner (Security Council Official Records, Vol. 1-15, Page 371).

The acceptance of Indian sovereignty is implicit in the U.S.' support for the Security Council resolution of May 1948 which called for the 'vacation of the entire state by Pakistani forces, the maintenance of a sufficient number of troops by India to ensure the return to peace, and a plebiscite after an unspecified period of time to be held under Indian auspices. Thenceforth every time the U.S. endorsed a plebiscite, it willy nilly endorsed the fact that Sovereignty over the whole of Kashmir vested in India till the time when it was held.

Ms. Raphel's remark that the Simla agreement ought to be scrapped because very few discussions had been held under it, turns logic on its head. Every border between nation is the result of an agreement, sometimes explicit, at others implicit. When both countries recognise the border there are no discussions. These arise only when there is a dispute. Between 1972 and 1990 there were very few such discussions because Pakistan accepted the LoC as the *de facto* international border. They began to question it once more only when an insurrection, carely fomented by them for four years, broke out in 1990. It was India's mistake that it even agreed to discuss Kashmir in any form or shape after that. That has given the opening to the U.S. that it may be seeking to exploit today.

In questioning the Instrument of Accession the Clinton Administration has questioned the basis of not only the accession of Kashmir to India, but of more than 600 princely states to India and Pakistan. What is more, since the Instrument was the lynchpin of the transfer of British paramountcy over the princely states to the successor governments of India and Pakistan, it calls into question the transfer of power itself, and consequently the legal basis for the existence of Pakistan and India.

Why on earth should it want to do so? If one were to believe its protestations it is with the noblest of motives—Peace and Human Rights.

Both of these are reasonable, even unexceptionable goals. But so far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the U.S. would achieve it far more easily if it put pressure on Pakistan to stop fomenting rebellion in Kashmir, told it to forget its legal claim to 'PoK' [Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir] and told both countries to respect the status quo and turn LoC into the international boundary, with perhaps minor modifications, as was envisaged beyond a shadow or doubt in the Simla agreement.

As for the Human Rights, Ms. Raphael who was in India when the Babri Masjid was demolished and quizzed several senior journalists, including this writer, about its fallout on Hindu-Muslim relations, knows better than anyone else in the State department just how tense these relations are today. She can hardly be ignorant of the holocaust that would follow if Kashmir was snatched away from the country.

The U.S. did start down the road outlined above in 1991 and to curb Pakistan activities in Kashmir it put the country on the terrorist watch list, and it repeatedly urged both countries to settle the dispute under the Simla agreement. But that was the policy of Mr. George Bush.

To gauge what this might be just take a look at where Kashmir—the whole state and not just Indian Jammu and Kashmir—is situated.

Kashmir is like a broad dagger thrust between Sinkiang and Tibet. What is more it is ideally suited to dominate the largest of the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan. A free Kashmir, acutely vulnerable to both India and Pakistan, because it is dependent on both for markets, tourists and access to the sea, will immediately look for a Godfather. Who could fill the bill better than the Americans?

There could be a secondary purpose also. This would be to drive a physical wedge between China and India. Unlike our own intellectuals, U.S. analysts could not have failed to grasp the significance of the Sino-Indian agreement on the Border areas, of Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao's nearly four hours of talks with the Chinese Premier, Mr. Li Peng, the great importance that China attached to the visit, and the unmistakable hints given by the latter that he expected much closer cooperation with India on international issues in the future. It is even possible that the outcome of Mr. Rao's visit to China tipped the scales within the U.S. administration in favour of the policy that it is now unveiling.

The above analysis admittedly gives a concreteness to U.S. design that could be misleading. U.S. analysts must know that an independent, united Kashmir will be resisted by both India and Pakistan. They have also learned from the public's reaction to the involvement of U.S. troops in Somalia, that Americans are not deeply interested in international affairs, and especially in military adventures abroad, if these mean a loss of American lives. Despite this when India's very nationhood is at stake, if the government's repeated assertions do not bring forth an explicit

endorsement of the validity of the Instrument of Accession, it will do well to put the worst construction on Ms. Raphael's statement.

The first need is to explore afresh whether Pakistan realises that it has finally reached a situation where it stands to lose more from its adventurism than to gain from it. If so, an agreement to settle somewhat along the LoC and then work jointly to give the Kashmiris the maximum possible autonomy within existing boundaries, may begin to look a lot more attractive even to them. If it does not, then India will do well to close the Kashmir dispute unilaterally, by declaring unambiguously that the accession of the State to India is no longer open to debate.

Secondly, India will do well to strengthen its bridges with China. China faces similar problems with regard to Tibet and may therefore welcome cooperation on this issue in its own self-interest.

Importance of Remarks

94AS0076B Madras *INDIAN EXPRESS* in English
9 Nov 93 p 8

[Article by Arati R. Jerath: "The Raphael Rhetoric; U.S. Line on Kashmir Might Spur New Strategic Alliance"]

[Text] We must indeed thank Robin Raphael. Deliberately or inadvertently, she has given us a peep into her mind and forewarned us of the direction in which her thoughts are running and the shape she intends to give to U.S. policy on South Asia.

Whatever the State Department may say now to defuse her bombshell, India cannot afford to ignore the signals coming loud and clear from her comments. She is, after all, the point person in Washington for South Asia. Moreover, she has a blank page on which to write and was hand-picked for the job by President Bill Clinton whom she knows personally. When a key person such as Raphael gives a back-grounder, her statements cannot be dismissed as off-the-cuff remarks and must be presumed to be inputs for a policy in the making, if not a part of official policy already.

The most disturbing element in Raphael's statement questioning the validity of Kashmir's accession to India is that she has sought to give a quantitatively new dimension to the entire issue. She has chosen to revive a 1947 U.S. position, which held Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory even before the United Nations put an international seal on it in 1948, thus taking the dispute beyond the confines of Indo-Pak rivalry over the state and the consequent threat of a nuclear war in the subcontinent which Washington has been touting as the reason for its excessive concern. In fact, Raphael's comments clearly hint at a direct U.S. interest in Kashmir which is not necessarily circumscribed by its policies on India and Pakistan.

Washington's escalating interest in Kashmir must be seen in the context of its strategically sensitive location. It provides direct access into Tibet and consequently China. It is also contiguous with the Islamic Crescent with a border just 20 kilometres away from the Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan where the battle lines currently being drawn by the U.S., Russia and Iran to gain supremacy could change the destiny of the entire region. If the U.S. desire for a foothold in this area after the Second World War was

primarily to contain Russia, today, its guns are trained on China and Iran. And Kashmir, with its unique position, has the potential of becoming a key factor in the new geopolitical strategy being fashioned in Washington to deal with the two nations the U.S. sees as major threats.

It is worth noting that the U.S. was the first country to open an embassy in the Tajik Capital of Dushanbe. It is also significant that Raphael's present tour, said to be aimed at acquainting herself with South Asia, takes her to Dushanbe and Moscow after Dhaka, Islamabad and Kabul.

To give Washington the benefit of the doubt when it says that Raphael's remarks are not a policy statement, it is true that the attempt to redraw the geopolitical map of the region by linking Kashmir to the Central Asian belt is merely one of the options being explored by strategists in the U.S. The Clinton administration's bewildering flip-flops on the Kashmir issue indicate that a policy has yet to be formulated. But the mounting pressures and the red herrings that pop up from time to time clearly suggest that the U.S. intends to keep its options on Kashmir open.

By letting the cat out of the bag on the new thinking in Washington, Raphael may have done us a great favour. If, indeed, her statements do not yet constitute U.S. policy, India must move in before they do and firmly link Kashmir to its own survival as a modern, secular, market democracy. An independent Kashmir, subject to buffeting pressures in a region where ambitious powers are striving to carve out spheres of influence, cannot benefit anyone, neither India, nor Pakistan, nor even the Kashmiri people. One only has to look at Afghanistan to see the consequences of meddling in areas where dormant tribal affiliations can resurface with a vengeance in bloody ethnic strife.

Has the world already forgotten the brutal onslaught on Kashmir by Waziri tribesmen from the North-West Frontier in September 1947 when the state was not under India's protective umbrella? Can Pakistan afford a sharpening of existing fissiparous tendencies in Baluchistan and the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] once a free Kashmir which includes POK becomes a reality?

As for India, the Kashmir question has never been so vital for its future. A second partition, once again on religious lines, fostered by Pakistan, could destroy the foundation of the Indian nation. An independent Kashmir is bound to raise a big question mark on the status of 120 million Muslims in the rest of India, making the bloody aftermath of the Ayodhya crisis look like a teddy bear's picnic.

The trouble is that the perceptions of the Raphaels of this world are shaped by shallow interactions on Delhi's cocktail circuit where flippant remarks pass off as studied analysis, and compounded by a decidedly grim situation on the ground in the Valley. Raphael is therefore not alone in believing that India has lost Kashmir, that it never was a part of the Indian mainstream, that severing the state from the rest of the country will not have any economic, social or political consequences here.

It is imperative for India to disabuse policy makers and strategists, not just in Washington but in other Western Capitals as well, of the fundamental fallacies in their perceptions without indulging in xenophobic hysteria or jingoism. The unanimous outburst here against Raphael's

statements is a good beginning. The strong reactions Raphael has provoked send a more effective message than any official exchange.

Unfortunately, Washington is too far away to understand the depth of feeling in India. There must be a follow-up to the protest. What is needed is a concerted strategy—some "creative diplomacy," to use Washington's new catchword—to hammer in some home truths to those who think they can resolve the problems of this region.

Here again, the Clinton administration may have unwittingly helped us. In trying to extricate itself from the tight spot in which it finds itself thanks to Raphael, the State Department has trilateralised the Kashmir issue by including China-held parts of the state in its definition of disputed territory. Although there has been no reaction from Beijing yet on the controversy, China cannot but be aware of the implications for its security of Washington's formulations. Similarly, Iran, which considers itself a major player in a region which has opened up with demise of the Soviet Union, will be watching events here very closely.

Quite clearly, the Clinton administration has ended up muddying the waters and if it is not careful, it may soon find that its ham-handed attempts to redraw the lines in this region will make allies of those it wants to see least in a strategic convergence—India, China and Iran.

'Two-Faced U.S. Foreign Policy'

94AS0076C Bombay THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA
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[Article by Bhaskar Menon; quotation marks as published]

[Text] New York, November 6. Robin Raphael, United States Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, lobbed a smoke-bomb into Indo-U.S. relations last week when, at a briefing for South Asian journalists in Washington, she said: "We view the whole of Kashmir as disputed territory, the status of which needs to be resolved." Responding to a question on why President Clinton in his United Nations speech had mentioned Kashmir, she said: "It was meant to say we see Kashmir on the radar screen along with Yugoslavia and Somalia and lots of other places in the former Soviet Union, Georgia, where there is civil conflict going on. We can't easily overlook it and there is a message in that."

At about the same time, former Congressman Stephen Solarz, who is expected to be the next American ambassador to India, was knocking the socks off a group of visiting Indian members of Parliament. At a meeting with them in Washington, with the media present, he asked a "hypothetical" question: "What effect would the secession of Kashmir have on the rest of India?"

In sum, these incidents point to the fact that after two decades of agreeing with New Delhi that the Kashmir issue should be settled bilaterally under the Simla Agreement, Washington has decided to internationalise it, and is doing so in the most disruptive manner. In negating Kashmir's accession to India, it is in effect questioning the integrity of the country as a whole. And by picturing India as analogous to Yugoslavia or Somalia, it is quite deliberately introducing tensions into a relationship that otherwise has improved substantially in recent years and looked ready to

take off into a growing economy partnership. Despite State Department clarifications, there is a clear perception among Indian observers of a new and dangerous thrust to American policy.

To make sense of that policy, it is necessary to see it as a product of powerful domestic forces contending to shape the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Largely responsible for what Indians would consider the negative aspects of American policy are the forces of the national security establishment, involving the military sectors of the economy, the vast intelligence and cover operations community, and the military itself, with the Pentagon serving as their joint institutional power-base. And largely responsible for what Indians would consider the positive elements of American policy are the mainstream forces of the country's vital and liberal democracy, its enormously productive industrial and trading establishments, and its cultural and intellectual institutions. During the Cold War, these forces worked coherently together to face the common threat of communalism, but since the collapse of the USSR, they have been in an increasingly uncomfortable relationship domestically. Inevitably, that is projected into a Jekyll and Hyde foreign policy.

This split personality of American foreign policy emerged to public view in 1992. At precisely the time when the Bush administration was talking of a New World Order centred on a revitalised United Nations, the Pentagon was circulating a 46 page strategy document that called for the United States to maintain a one-superpower world by thwarting the development of any potential rivals. The secret document was leaked to *The New York Times*, which, in a front-page story on 8 March 1992, said, "The Pentagon document articulates the clearest rejection to date of collective internationalism," the post World War II strategy incarnated in the United Nations.

In essence, the Pentagon strategy aims at blocking any country from going down the road to global competition with the United States. Nuclear proliferation is deemed a high priority in that context, and the paper supported the use of violence to prevent it. Articulating the Pentagon's priorities in South Asia, the document said that the United States "should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other States in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South West Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavour to rebuild our military relationship, given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns."

In another section pertinent to India, the Pentagon paper referred to nations "that could, in the future, develop strategic aims and a defence posture of regionwide or global domination." Because the United States no longer faced either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to its interests, it said, "We have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs." What steps might be involved at these lower levels was not addressed in the excerpts published in *The New York Times*. But in some cases they have been clearly evident. In Iraq, it involved the American ambassador suckering Saddam Hussein into invading Kuwait and precipitating international action to rid the country of all

weapons of mass destruction. In North Korea, it involved getting the government to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the expectation of economic largesse, and then conducting war games in South Korea that drove Pyongyang to violate its agreement with the IAEA.

In South Asia, faced with democratic India on one side and long-standing American ally Pakistan on the other, the approach has been more covert, and can be described only by resorting to a kind of join-the-dots journalism. Harshad Mehta's allegations against the Prime Minister and the fact that Ms Robin Raphel, a CIA analyst before she joined the Foreign Service, was the political Counsellor at the American embassy in New Delhi till the summer of 1993 could be some of these dots. The picture that merges is of an attempt to destabilise India and split it along communal lines. Recent American attempts to highlight the issue of Kashmir would fall into that pattern, and it behooves Indians to take that as a working hypothesis in formulating popular and policy response, especially to possible terrorist events during the current elections.

China Policy Related

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[Article by Subhash Kirpekar: "U.S. Exploiting Kashmir"]

[Text] New Delhi, November 9. The United States desire to contain China is being perceived here as a possible reason for its exploiting the Kashmir dispute to further its own national interests.

It is being said in influential circles here that the U.S. is not as much interested in India, Pakistan or Kashmir directly as it is in using the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) region to gain direct access to Tibet, sit at the doorstep of China and needle China on human rights violations in Tibet.

A second U.S. objective is to compel India and Pakistan to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The Kashmir dispute comes handy to the U.S. in trying to achieve this other objective also.

The "China factor" is important as the U.S. never reconciled itself to Pakistan ceding certain areas in the northern territory of PoK to China in 1962. This made possible the Karakoram highway and gave a motorable road to China leading to Karachi and the waters of the Arabian Sea.

As it happened, Sardar Swaran Singh was India's foreign minister then and leading a delegation to hold the first of five rounds of talks with Pakistan. Some of the senior members of the delegation, including Mr G. Parthasarthy, India's high commissioner to Pakistan, were in favour of calling off the talks in protest against Pakistan's act of ceding territory to China which did not belong to Pakistan.

However, Mr Swaran Singh, after gathering a second opinion from other delegates and also those who were not part of the delegation, like Mr Pran Chopra, felt it more prudent to continue with the talks as walking out in protest would be portrayed as India having wriggled out of a situation.

During the Indo-Pak talks then, India lodged its protest with Pakistan over its ceding of this territory to China.

When China conveyed its displeasure over the Indian stand, it was stated that the agreement provided that what was subsequently to be done with the ceded territory depended on the settlement reached.

The view of a leading American journalist, Mr Tom Brady, then was that it was a clever move by China to get Pakistan to cede a territory that gave it access to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf region. As things stand, that territory is still with China and it rankles not only India but the U.S. also.

It is possible that in this backdrop, the U.S. could be floating the idea of a "unified independent Kashmir" through various Kashmiri groups. There is no hard evidence for this inference but considering that an independent Kashmir might be more amenable to U.S. influence than to that of India or Pakistan, it would be logically desirable from the U.S. viewpoint to cultivate this proposition, more so because of the unforeseeable kind of problems that might arise in the Central Asian region and in Pakistan in the not too distant future. Put simply, an independent Kashmir serves U.S. interests better.

It is known that the U.S. policy on China is to contain it and continue to involve China in the world mainstream so that it could convert itself into a democracy at some point of time. Its first major approach to China, incidentally, was through Pakistan when Dr Henry Kissinger paved the way for the President, Mr Richard Nixon, to visit Beijing in the full glare of international publicity.

Although U.S. regards Tibet as an autonomous region of China, it continues to use Tibet as an important stick to beat China with on the issue of human rights violations in Tibet. If only the U.S. can get to play a role in sorting out the Kashmir dispute, it feels, it can increase the pressure on China by focussing more sharply on human rights violations in Tibet.

In this context, when Ms Robin Raphel spoke of Kashmir being disputed, the U.S. interest in the PoK part therefore cannot be lost sight of by Indian policy makers. It is that

part of Kashmir, more than the part with India, that gives direct access to Tibet and China and serves U.S. interests better.

There is a strong view among Kashmiri groups also that neither the U.S. nor the European Parliament should be allowed to play the broker in resolving the Kashmir issue. Despite that, if the U.S. does get to play a role because India and Pakistan cannot solve the problem through bilateral talks, the U.S. could well use that influence, after resolving the Kashmir problem, to force India and Pakistan to sign on the NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty].

Unfortunately, there is no Policy Planning Group in the external affairs ministry today. Such a think tank existed during the days of Mrs Indira Gandhi's prime ministership and was led by Mr G. Parthasarthy.

There is a view that such a group needs to be set up now to provide valuable inputs and help avoid the impression that government's responses were of a knee-jerk type. Apart from experts, strategists and academicians, it could also have articulate businessmen who can play an important role in lobbying abroad for India.

As far back as 1988, a former foreign secretary had recommended to the government to employ Mr Mark Siegel as a lobbyist for India in the U.S.

Taking into consideration that the Israeli ambassador to India has backed India on the cordon around Hazratbal shrine issue, India could build on it and involve the powerful and influential Israeli-Jewish lobby to which Mr Siegel belongs to serve Indian interests.

At a time when Pakistan is going all out to befriend and convert U.S. Senators and British MPs [Member of Parliament] to support its weak case on Kashmir, observers feel it would be prudent for India to get its act together and make the best of its strong case on Kashmir which might otherwise go by default.

Also interesting is the fact that relations between Israel and China are warming up as are Sino-Indian relations. Sources say it is perhaps time for a New Delhi-Beijing-Tel Aviv axis to swing into operation to thwart evil designs on Kashmir.

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